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Abstract 
Within a week of the attack of September 11, 2001, a consortium of researchers from across the 
United States distributed a survey asking about the circumstances in which respondents learned 
of the attack (their flashbulb memories) and the facts about the attack itself (their event 
memories).  Follow-up surveys were distributed 11, 25, and 119 months after the attack.  The 
study, therefore, examines retention of flashbulb memories and event memories at a substantially 
longer retention interval than any previous study employing a test-retest methodology, allowing 
for the study of such memories over the long-term.  There was rapid forgetting of both flashbulb 
and event memories within the first year, but the forgetting curves leveled off after that, not 
significantly changing even after a 10-year delay.  Despite the initial rapid forgetting, confidence 
remained high throughout the 10-year period.  Five putative factors affecting flashbulb memory 
consistency and event memory accuracy were examined: (1) attention to media (2) the amount of 
discussion, (3) residency, (4) personal loss and/or inconvenience, and (5) emotional intensity.  
After ten years, none of these factors predicted flashbulb memory consistency; media attention 
and ensuing conversation predicted event memory accuracy.  Inconsistent flashbulb memories 
were more likely to be repeated rather than corrected over the ten-year period; inaccurate event 
memories, on the other hand, were more likely to be corrected.  The findings suggests that even 
traumatic memories and those implicated in a community’s collective identity may be 
inconsistent over time and these inconsistency can persist without the corrective force of external 
influences.  
 
Keywords:  Long-term memory, flashbulb memories, event memories, September 11, 
autobiographical memories, collective memories 
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 The present paper reports on a 10-year longitudinal study of both flashbulb and event 
memories of the attack in the United States on September 11, 2001.  As we use the term, a 
flashbulb memory is a memory for the circumstance in which one learned of a public event.  The 
memory may be reported at any time, but an essential characteristic of a flashbulb memory is 
that it is long-lasting, that is, that people can report on the reception event long after it occurred. 
Flashbulb memories are not about the public event itself, nor are they about what is learned 
about the event from others; rather they are about the reception event in which one hears news 
about a public event.  (The event is, by definition, public, inasmuch as it is the topic of a public 
discussion.)  Although people no doubt form memories of reception events after hearing any 
piece of news, most of these memories will be quickly forgotten in most instances.  Flashbulb 
memories, on the other hand, are exceptional because people report details of the reception event 
after extraordinarily long periods of time, as Brown and Kulik (1977) emphasized in their 
pioneering work.  That is, the formation of a flashbulb memory is probably the exception rather 
the rule when it comes to reception events.  In the context of discussions of flashbulb memory, 
the term event memory is reserved for memories for the public event that led to the flashbulb 
memory (Larsen, 1992).  In the case of 9/11, people possess both flashbulb memories e.g., where 
they were when they learned about the attack, and event memories e.g., that four planes were 
involved. 
Flashbulb memories, and their associated event memory, have garnered a great deal of 
interest since Brown and Kulik (1977) first brought them to the attention of the psychological 
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community.  There are many reasons for this interest:  Researchers treat them as examples of 
long-term emotional memories and as special cases of the more general class of traumatic 
memories, for instance (e.g., Berntsen & Rubin, 2006).  In addition, flashbulb memories are a 
distinctive form of autobiographical memory, a topic of great interest to psychologists (Rubin, 
2005).  Unlike most autobiographical memories, they are built around public events.  In the case 
of flashbulb memories, the public event appears to have personal meaning and consequences for 
the individual rememberer.  That is, the memory refers to events for which the personal and the 
public intersect.  As a result, flashbulb memories are of concern to scholars studying both 
individual and social identity (Neisser, 1982).  
Flashbulb memories and Forgetting 
A central question for those interested in flashbulb memories is how to best characterize 
their long-term retention.  When Brown and Kulik (1977) first examined this issue, they initially 
simply asked participants many years after the event occurred whether they remembered the 
circumstances in which participants learned of the event.  Brown and Kulik noted, however, that 
“the division [between possessing a flashbulb memory and not possessing one] [is] not so 
absolute, and, more importantly, within the account there [is] much to interest us” (p. 79).  As a 
result, they moved beyond their dichotomous measure and also examined specific features of 
participants’ reports of reception events, the “who, what, when, and where” of the reception 
event.  They then investigated how many of these canonical features were or were not contained 
in a reported flashbulb memory.  For Brown and Kulik, errors of omission (that is, those 
instances in which people claimed not to remember a specific canonical feature) provided insight 
into “variations as well as constancies …in the content of the reports” (p. 79). 
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For many researchers, this focus on errors of omission captures only one aspect of what it 
means to forget (e.g., see Johnson & Raye, 1981; Winograd & Neisser, 1992).  In most tests of 
memory, people are said to fail to remember previously studied material not only if they state 
that they do not remember, but also if they remember the material inaccurately.  That is, 
forgetting involves not just errors of omission, but also errors of commission.  Brown and 
Kulik’s methods focused on errors of omission, and did not assess errors of commission. 
To study both errors of omission and errors of commission, psychologists have often 
employed a test-retest methodology.  Participants are asked as soon as possible after a 
consequential, often emotionally charged public event for their memory for the circumstances in 
which they learned of the event and then are given follow-up assessments several months or 
more afterwards.  The follow-up recollections are then compared with the first recollection, 
resulting in a consistency score between the first and subsequent assessments.  A “forgetting” 
curve can then be plotted on the basis of these consistency scores. 
Of course, this method does not permit a researcher to assess absolute accuracy, in that 
the researcher still does not have access to what actually unfolded during the reception event (see 
Curci & Conway, 2012, for a discussion of this concern, and related issues).  Moreover, it creates 
a situation in which participants might confuse their memory for the reception event with their 
memory of their first report, though the number of retests does not appear to affect the level of 
consistency (Kvavilashvili, Mirani, Schlagman, Foley, & Kornbrot, 2009).  There is also some 
concern that the first report is an unreliable index if it is not collected within a day or two after 
the event, though in most studies collection within the first week or so appears to be adequate 
(Collucia, Bianco, & Brandimonte, 2006; Julian, Bohannon, & Aue, 2009; Kvavilashvili et al., 
2009; Lee & Brown, 2003; but see Schmidt, 2004; Winningham, Hyman, & Dinnel, 2000).  
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Thus, although the comparison of retest with test offers a good first approximation of reception 
recall if one assumes that the initial, immediate report is fairly accurate, researchers who employ 
this methodology cautiously use the term consistency rather than accuracy when reporting their 
results. 
To date, using either Brown and Kulik’s method or the test-retest methodology, 
researchers have studied a large number of public events, including the deaths of public figures, 
e.g., John F. Kennedy (Brown & Kulik, 1977), Princess Diana (Kvavilashvili, Mirani, 
Schlagman, & Kornbrot, 2003), and King Baudouin of Belgium (Finkenauer, Luminet, Gisle, El-
Ahmandi, van der Linden et al., 1998); politically salient events, including the resignation of 
Margaret Thatcher (Wright, Gaskell, & O’Muircheartaigh, 1998) and the election of Barack 
Obama (Koppel, Brown, Stone, Coman, & Hirst, 2013); and natural or man-made disasters, 
including an earthquake in Turkey (Er, 2003) and the explosion of the Challenger (Bohannon & 
Symons, 1992; Neisser & Harsch, 1992).  Though mostly emotionally charged and negatively 
valenced, some studied events have been positively valenced, e.g., the German withdrawal from 
Denmark at the end of War World II (Berntsen & Thomsen, 2005), the fall of the Berlin Wall 
(Bohn & Berntsen, 2007), and success at the World Cup (Kopietz & Echterhoff, 2014; Tinti, 
Schmidt, Testa, & Levine, 2014).  Moreover, although most research has involved events salient 
to the public at large, some have studied emotionally charged public events relevant to only a 
small group of people, as is the case when family or friends learn of the death of a loved one 
(Pillemer, 2009; Rubin and Kozin, 1984). 
As to the 9/11 attack, there have been over 20 studies of learning to date (e.g., Budson, 
Simons, Waring, Sullivan, Hussoin, & Schacter, 2007; A. R. Conway, Skitka, Hemmerich, & 
Kershaw, 2009; Curci & Luminet, 2006; Davidson, Cook, & Glisky, 2006; Greenberg, 2004; 
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Hirst, Phelps, Buckner, Budson, Cuc et al., 2009; Kvavilashvili. Mirani, Schlagman, Foley, & 
Kornbrot, 2009; Luminet & Curci, 2008; Luminet, Curci, Marsh, Wessel, Constantin, Genocz, et 
al., 2004; Paradis, Solomom, Florer, Thompson, 2004; Pezdek, 2003; Qin, Mitchell, Johnson, 
Krystal, Southwick et al., 2003; Schmidt, 2004; Shapiro, 2006; Sharot, Martorella, Delgado, & 
Phelps, 2007; Smith, Bibi, & Sheard, 2003; Talarico & Rubin, 2003; Tekcan,	  Berivan,	  Gülgöz	  &	  Er,	  2003;	  Weaver & Krug, 2004). 
Several conclusions have emerged from this flurry of research.  First, consequential and 
emotionally charged public events indeed can lead to long-lasting memories for the reception 
events.  For the retention intervals studied to date, Brown and Kulik’s (1977) characterization 
that “nobody forgets” is correct in that, for the studied public events, few people fail to report 
that they simply cannot remember the circumstances in which they learned of the event.  Second, 
these memories can contain both errors of omission and commission.  For some researchers, 
then, flashbulb memories may be exceptional, in that people continue to report a recollection of 
the reception event even after a substantial delay, but they are unexceptional in that they are 
replete with errors of omission and commission, just like “ordinary” autobiographical memories 
(e.g., Talarico & Rubin, 2003).  For us, the mere existence of selective errors of omissions and 
commission does not disqualify a memory as being classified as “flashbulb,” even if it makes it 
“ordinary” (see Curci & Conway, 2012, for a discussion of this point).  Like Brown and Kulik 
(1977), we also feel that it is necessary to explore the ‘variations as well as constancies …in the 
content of the reports” (p. 79).  Consequently, among other things, we will be interested here in 
the consistency between initial and subsequent recollections. 
There is one exceptional feature of flashbulb memories, besides their long-term retention, 
that is widely accepted and deserves mention.  Unlike many “ordinary” autobiographical 
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memories, people are extremely confident in the accuracy of even their inconsistent flashbulb 
memories, even after several years have passed (see, for instance, Neisser & Harsch, 1992; 
Neisser, Winograd, Bergman, Shreider, Palmer, & Weldon, 1996).  For example, a day after the 
9/11 attack, Talarico and Rubin (2003) asked participants to record both the circumstance in 
which they learned of the attack, as well as another “important” autobiographical event that had 
occurred in the last week.  In follow-up testing one, six, and 32 weeks after the attack, there were 
similar rates of forgetting for both types of memories.  On the other hand, whereas confidence in 
ordinary autobiographical memories declined over time as the consistency scores declined, 
confidence in flashbulb memories remained high, despite the similar rates of decline in 
consistency.  This finding is important in that it suggests that individuals are not simply “filling 
in” missing details about the reception event with guesses as they recollect.  Rather when 
responding with an inconsistent memory, they truly believe that they are “remembering” it 
accurately (i.e., they are making reality/source monitoring errors, Johnson, Hashtroudi & 
Lindsay, 1993). 
Factors Affecting Flashbulb Memory Consistency 
As more psychologists utilized the test-retest methodology, questions about what makes a 
flashbulb memory consistent or inconsistent over the long-term naturally arose.  If flashbulb 
memories are like “ordinary autobiographical memories,” in that they evidence errors of 
omission and commission, then psychologists hypothesized that many of the factors affecting the 
retention of “ordinary” autobiographical memories would also affect flashbulb memories, for 
example, the emotional intensity of the event, its importance or consequentiality, the degree to 
which it is rehearsed, its distinctiveness, the level of surprise associated with it (e.g., Conway, 
1995; Conway, Anderson, Larsen, Donneley, McDaniel, McClelland, & Rawles, 1994; 
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McCloskey, Wible, & Cohen, 1988; ).  Whereas each of these factors has been shown to affect 
consistency in some studies, other studies fail to find the same effect.  Comparison across studies 
is difficult, inasmuch as it often involves different events, but the diverse set of findings suggests 
that there may be no single necessary condition for a consistent flashbulb memory (see Talarico 
& Rubin, 2008, for a review). 
Interestingly, researchers have generally not contrasted the factors that might predict 
consistency with those that might predict confidence ratings or event memory accuracy (for an 
exception, see Day & Ross, 2014).  This is surprising, in that it is well appreciated that the 
relation between accuracy and confidence is not straightforward (Roediger, Wixted, & DeSoto, 
2012).  For instance, even in the laboratory, manipulations affecting confidence do not 
necessarily lead to similar effect on accuracy (e.g., Wells & Bradfield, 1999).  
Long Long-term Memory 
Surprisingly, inasmuch as an essential defining characteristic of flashbulb memories is 
their long-term retention, most flashbulb memory studies examine retention intervals of a few 
months, or a most a few years.  The few examining retention intervals greater than a few years, 
as Brown and Kulik (1977) did, did not use a test-retest methodology, the established standard at 
present.  Some, such as Brown and Kulik and Yarmey and Bull (1978), only examined whether 
participants possessed a flashbulb memory, without any concerns about its consistency.  Others 
used innovative techniques that only allow for assessing accuracy of a limited range of features 
of the flashbulb memory (Berntsen & Thomsen, 2005).  The present ten-year longitudinal study 
is, therefore, unique.  A few studies of “ordinary” autobiographical or semantic memories have 
longitudinally tracked memories over a 10-year period, or more (e.g., Burt, Kemp, & Conway, 
2001; Catal & Fitzgerald, 2004; see also Linton, 1986; Rubin, 2005; Wagenaar, 1986).  Using a 
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cross-sectional methodology, Bahrick and his colleagues studied forgetting curves for a wide 
variety of material for intervals stretching up to 50 years or more (Bahrick, 1983; 1984; Bahrick, 
Bahrick, & Whittlinger, 1975; see also Conway, Cohen, & Stanhope, 1991; Squire & Slater, 
1975; Stanhope, Cohen, & Conway, 1993).  For instance, they asked college alumni ranging in 
age from their 20’s to their 70’s to recollect the Spanish vocabulary they learned while in college 
or the names of the streets of their college town.   
 As they pertain to the interests in this investigation, the results of these studies indicate 
that (1) there is substantial forgetting of both autobiographical and semantic memories in the first 
few years, both in terms of reported recollection and in terms of accuracy, (2) the forgetting rate 
asymptotes thereafter, conforming to a power function, (3) there is consistency between what is 
recollected at one time, even if incorrect, and what is recollected subsequently and (4) if a 
memory is retained for a certain period of time, it is unlikely to show further forgetting.  Bahrick 
and his colleagues suggested that memories go into a “permastore” after approximately six years 
(Bahrick, 1984).  The conclusions, however, are at best limited to “ordinary” autobiographical 
memories, or semantic memories.  Whether the “permastore” concept is applicable to flashbulb 
memories is an open question. 
The Present 9/11 Study 
Can what has been observed in studies of flashbulb memories with retention intervals of a 
few months to three years be extended to longer retention intervals, such as ten years?  And can 
one extend the studies of long-term memory of “ordinary” autobiographical event and semantic 
memories to long long-term flashbulb memories and their associated event memories?  With 
questions such as these in mind, within a week of the attack of September 11, 2001, the authors 
of this paper distributed a survey at locations around the United States and asked about the 
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circumstances in which participants learned of the attack, facts about the attack (e.g., how many 
planes were involved), characteristics of the memories participants held (e.g., confidence 
ratings), and the way participants reacted to the news, among others.  We then followed up with 
similar questions 11 months, 35 months, and finally 119 months after the attack.  (We always 
tested participants one month before an anniversary of the attack.) 
 Several years ago, we offered a preliminary three-year report (Hirst et al., 2009).  The 
findings fell into three general categories.  First, we examined the consistency of flashbulb 
memories and their associated level of confidence, as well as the accuracy of event memories.  
We observed a decline in the consistency of the reported flashbulb and event memories over the 
three-year period, even as confidence ratings remained high.  Most of the forgetting occurred in 
the first year.  The dissociation between consistency and confidence ratings is consistent with 
several studies, including Talarico and Rubin’s (2003) 9/11 study.  The finding that the level of 
consistency seemed to flatten out after a year is consistent with Kvavilashvili et al. (2009), who 
found, again for 9/11, similar levels of consistency between their two-year retest and the final 
three-year retest.  Our results differed from Schmolck, Buffalo, and Squire’s (2000) study of 
flashbulb memories for the O.J. Simpson verdict.  These researchers showed little forgetting after 
15 months, but more dramatic forgetting after 32 months, suggesting that memory distortions 
built up over time.  They attributed this build-up largely to source monitoring errors. 
The second class of results in our previous report focused on predictions of consistency, 
examining: (1) residency at the time of the attack, (2) the level of emotional intensity, (3) the 
personal loss or inconvenience, (4) the amount of media attended to immediately after the attack 
and in the ensuing period, and (5) the amount of discussion with others about the attack (referred 
to as ensuing conversation).  None of these were correlated with flashbulb memory consistency. 
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As for event memories, all the studied factors other than emotional intensity were 
correlated with accuracy.  The effects of residency and personal loss and inconvenience could be 
traced to variations in the level of ensuing conversation.  Moreover, the association between 
media attention and accuracy was reinforced by contrasting the forgetting curve associated with 
memories for the event of the Challenger explosion with the forgetting curves associated with 
memories for the event of the 9/11 attack.  Not only did the curves differ, but, critically, the 
difference reflected variations in the level of media coverage of these two events.  Both media 
attention and ensuing conversations probably affected event memory because they encouraged 
rehearsal of the facts surrounding the attack (see Breslin & Safer, 2011). 
The third set of results we examined traced how the memories changed over time. Unlike 
most investigations to date, we not only assessed changes in the average consistency or accuracy 
scores, but also what happened to inconsistent or inaccurate memories from the first year. 
Inconsistent flashbulb memories were more likely to be repeated than corrected, while inaccurate 
event memories were more likely to be corrected than repeated.  Furthermore, the accuracy of 
event memory was mediated by the level of media attention, suggesting that media might not 
only reinforce accurate memories, but also correct inaccuracies. 
What might we expect ten years after the attack?  It is difficult to generalize from Hirst et 
al (2009), for several reasons.  (1) In that study, we based our conclusions on performance at 
three separate time periods, one of which served as the baseline from which to compare the other 
two periods.  A relation observed with two points might constitute a trend, but does not 
guarantee a long-term pattern.  (2) There is no a priori reason to assume that what holds for three 
years holds for ten.  For instance, the increase in memory distortions over time that Schmolck et 
al. (2000) observed for the Simpson verdict may not have been observed by Hirst et al. for delays 
	   	   Ten-­‐Year	  Follow-­‐up	  	   13	  
as short as three years, but may be observed after a ten-year delay.  (3) Although forgetting 
seemed to be slowing in Hirst et al., there was not an additional time interval to assess whether 
memories had become resistant to forgetting, as Bahrick’s (1984) work suggests they eventually 
should.  (4) Declines in confidence that are not detected after a short retention interval may be 
detected after a longer retention interval.  (5) The factors determining the shape of the forgetting 
curves for the first three years may differ from those associated with forgetting over longer 
retention intervals.  (6) Inconsistencies may be repeated once, but may not continue to be 
repeated. 
With these considerations in mind, we distributed a survey similar to the one we used at 
Year 3 to previous respondents.  We also collected an additional “new” sample of individuals 
who had never participated in the project. 
Method 
 Because we have described the method as it applied up to Year 3 in detail elsewhere 
(Hirst et al., 2009), we focus here on information relevant to our ten-year follow-up.  
Participants, Recruitment, and Procedure 
 For the first three surveys, we recruited participants between September 17, 2001 and 
September 21, 2001 (Survey 1), August 5 and August 20, 2002 (Survey 2), and August 9 and 
August 20, 2004 (Survey 3).  Recruitment for Survey 4 took place between August 1, 2011 and 
August 15, 2011.  The original recruitment was done in seven locations: Boston and Cambridge, 
MA; New Haven, CT; New York, NY; Washington, DC; St. Louis, MO; Palo Alto, CA; Santa 
Cruz, CA.  As a result, follow-up participants in subsequent surveys came from the same areas, 
though in many instances they no longer lived in these areas.  The one exception is Boston, 
which used a slightly different procedure when recruiting participants on Survey 1 and hence did 
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not figure in the follow-up surveys reported here.  Over the first three surveys, we had a total of 
3,246 participants.  For Survey 4, we tried to contact all 3,246 participants, either through postal 
mail or email.  When an email or a postal envelope was returned, we searched through the web to 
find additional means of reaching a respondent, using, in the main, Facebook, Google+, and 
LinkedIn.  Although we could not associate contact information with a particular survey, codes 
that participants generated allowed us to connect the responses of a given individual across the 
surveys they filled out.  Some participants claimed that they had previously participated, but they 
supplied an incorrect ID.  Attempts were made to find a match by examining handwriting, 
demographic information, and so on.  The participants in the No Match category reflect those for 
which a match could not be found at any point in the project.  In the end, 202 participants took 
all four surveys.  These participants will be our main focus of interest. 
As shown in Table 1, 52% of those who had completed Surveys 1, 2, and 3 returned 
Survey 4, a good return rate for studies of this kind (Baruch, 1999).  Of the 2117 participants 
who returned Survey 1, 10% of them ended up participating at every stage of the ten-year 
project.  This return rate is reasonable, given the length of the project, the difficulty in keeping 
track of people over such a long time period, the extensive nature of the survey, and the fact that 
we did not compensate participants for their efforts.  Although it involved participants across the 
United States, our sampling should not be viewed as representative of the American public.  
We undertook several dropout analyses.  For the features of age, gender, residence at the 
time of the attack, student membership at the time of the attack, political affiliation, 
race/ethnicity, and religion, we found no differences between those who took all four surveys 
and (1) those who only took Survey 1 and (2) those participants who took Surveys 1 through 3, 
but not Survey 4 (ps > .20).  The one dimension on which we did find a dropout effect concerned 
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personal loss and/or inconvenience. The measure is described in detail in Hirst et al. (2009) and 
below.  Briefly, the percentage of participants reporting personal loss and/or inconvenience was 
26.9% for those participants who only took Survey 1, 27% for those who took Surveys 1 and 2; 
33.8% for those who took Surveys 1, 2, and 3; 35.6% for those who took Surveys 1, 2, 3, and 4.  
According to Fisher’s exact test, those who took Survey 1 only or Surveys 1 and 2 could not be 
considered as two groups.  Similarly, those who took Surveys 1, 2, and 3 and Surveys 1, 2, 3, and 
4 could also not be considered as two groups.  We therefore have two sets of participants:  those 
who only took the early surveys and those who took the surveys in the latter part of the study as 
well.  The associations between personal loss and/or inconvenience and these two sets of 
participants was significant, p < .01.  Participants were probably more motivated to continue if 
they had experienced personal loss and/or inconvenience. 
 At every stage of the study, we recruited new participants, individuals who had not 
responded to any previous survey. They served as controls for the returning participants.  This 
New Group is labeled “Survey 4 only” in Table 1.  To obtain this group of participants, we 
distributed surveys by hand from tables set up on or near the campus of New York University, 
the New School, and Georgetown University (that is, in New York City and Washington, DC).  
In addition, we sought new participants through Amazon Mechanical Turk and paid them 50 
cents for their efforts. 
 For all four surveys, participants were told that they had a week to fill out the survey.  
Surveys could be filled out either on-line or on paper and then mailed back to the experimenters 
using a stamped return envelope.  We combine the two samples as there were no differences in 
the responses offered on-line as opposed to on paper (for each question in the survey, ps > .50). 
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Demographic information can be found in Table 2.  Although the match was not perfect, 
the New sample resembled the Four-Sample survey to a substantial degree.  Analyses of how 
responses to the questions in the survey differed across these demographic categories are beyond 
the scope of the present report. 
Surveys 
 The content of Survey 4 was similar to the content of Surveys 2 and 3, with small 
changes made to reflect the time Survey 4 was taking place.  For example, Survey 2 asked 
questions that began “In the last year,….”; Survey 3 asked “In the last three years,…”;  Survey 
4’s questions began, “In the last seven years, ….”   Inasmuch as Survey 4 was administered one 
and half months before the 10th Anniversary of the attack, for some questions, such as those 
involving media attention, we also began several questions with “In the last few months, ….”  
Inasmuch as our findings did not differ for the “seven-year” questions and the “last few months” 
questions, we do not report the results for the “last few months” questions here.  Each survey 
was approximately 17 pages long (when printed) and took about 45 minutes to complete.  Copies 
can be found at http://911memory.nyu.edu.  Although the surveys explored a variety of topics, 
we focus here on those relevant to the formation and retention of flashbulb and event memories. 
As Table 3 indicates, questions fell into three categories:  (1) specific memories for the 
circumstances in which one learned of the attack, focusing here on six canonical features;  (2) 
specific memories of the event itself, focusing on five different “facts” (e.g., number of planes, 
location of President Bush at the time of the attack); and (3) ratings related to factors affecting 
performance.  We examined five potential factors, as in Hirst et al. (2009).  With respect to the 
questions about the canonical features of flashbulb memories, we followed each probe with one 
of two follow-up questions.  Half of the potential participants were sent a questionnaire assessing 
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their confidence in their response [with the question “How confident (on a 1 – 5 scale) is your 
recollection?”].  The other half received a questionnaire assessing how well they thought that 
they could remember the information in the future [“In 10 years, how well (on a 1 – 5 scale) do 
you think you will remember this?”]  Ninety-two of the 202 participants in our Four-Survey 
sample returned the confidence version; 110, the forecasting version.  We also asked questions 
pertinent to what kinds of relevant media participants had been exposed to over the ten-year 
period (e.g., did you see the film Fahrenheit 911, the film United 93?)  In what follows, we 
present data from all 202 participants, except when discussing confidence.  For these discussions, 
we confine ourselves to the 92 participants who received the confidence questions. 
Coding 
 A detailed coding manual was developed for Survey 1 and subsequently adapted for 
Surveys 2 – 4 (see Hirst et al., 2009, for details; the manuals can be found at 
http://911memory.nyu.edu).  There were two general coding schemes.  For some questions, there 
might be multiple ways to respond, but only a single response was required.  For instance, when 
asked “How did you first learn of the attack?” participants could respond, for example, with 
“TV,” “Radio” or “Telephone,” but only one of these devices played a role when they first 
learned of the attack.  The coding scheme listed alternatives [specifically, TV, Radio, E-
mail/Instant message, Phone call (including Voice messages), Visual sighting, Word of mouth, 
Sounds/screams, Sirens, Other, Not stated].  Using a number system, the coding indicated which 
of these options best fit the participant’s response.  The second coding scheme allowed for 
multiple responses.  For instance, more than one city was the target of the attack.  As a result, 
coders recorded all the responses a participant gave to the question “In the vicinity of which 
cities did the airplanes end up?”  To assess interrater reliability, we randomly selected 10% of 
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the surveys to be dual coded.  We then calculated kappas or Cronbach’s alphas, whichever was 
appropriate, for each question.  For Survey 4, as well as the other surveys, interrater reliability 
was always greater than .80. 
Results 
 We divide our results into three sections:  (1) Forgetting and confidence, (2) Factors 
affecting performance, and (3) Changes in inconsistent or inaccurate memories.  In each section, 
we first discuss flashbulb memories and then event memories.  In the main, because we are 
interested in mnemonic change over time in the same person, we confine our analyses to those 
individuals who participated in all four surveys. We note any differences arising between the 
results reported in Hirst et al. (2009) with the larger Three-Survey sample and the results 
uncovered here for the Four-Survey sample.  We examined other combinations of participation, 
(e.g., participation, e.g., Surveys 1 & 2 only), and did not find any differences that would affect 
the conclusion in the present report.  Details can be obtained from the first author.  We present 
the relevant data from our New participants at various points below when they address specific 
concerns. 
Forgetting and Confidence 
 Flashbulb Memories.  In the Four-Survey sample, in Survey 4, 99.5% of participants 
responded with a recollection for at least 5 of the six questions probing for canonical features.  
Using Brown and Kulik’s dichotomous measure (did or did not report remembering the reception 
event, regardless of accuracy and level of elaboration), it would appear that all but one of our 
participants, if not all of them, still have a flashbulb memory of 9/11 after ten years.  But, as 
noted, there is another sense of forgetting in the literature on flashbulb memories, captured by 
the question:  Even though participants produced recollections, did they nevertheless produce 
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errors of commission?  And given our interest in long-term retention, was the level of forgetting, 
in this sense, the same, greater, or lesser for Survey 4 as it was for Survey 3? 
Consistency.  Inasmuch as all the flashbulb memory questions required a single response, 
a response on Survey 2 thru Survey 4 was considered consistent with the response offered on 
Survey 1 if the coding matched.  For example, for the question “How did you first learn about 
the attack?”, if a participant stated that she learned from the radio on Survey 1 and from TV on 
Survey 4, her Survey 4 response was scored as a “0,” that is, inconsistent.  If the Survey 4 
response had been “radio,” it would have been scored as a “1,” that is, consistent.  The total 
consistency score was the average of the six questions with which we probed the canonical 
features of flashbulb memories, producing a value from 0 to 1 (again, see Table 3 for the 
canonical features).  Our scoring method differs slightly from others, such as Neisser and Harsch 
(1992), who used a three-point (0 – 2) rather than a two-point (0 or 1) classification scheme.  For 
Neisser and Harsch, responses were either absent or inconsistent (0), or consistent with different 
degrees of specificity (1 or 2).  We collapsed their two consistency scores into one single value.  
Our measure, then, is more likely to emphasize the consistency of a response than would 
Neisser-Harsch, in that the latter method could elicit a lower score, relative to the entire scale, 
than ours would if a consistent response was not very specific.  In terms of the pattern of results, 
as opposed to absolute values, Hirst et al. (2009) found no difference between the Neisser-
Harsch scoring and the present one for the Three-Survey sample.  An examination of 10% of the 
Four-Survey sample produced equivalent similarities.  Figure 1a contains the results across the 
four surveys for those who completed all four surveys, using our coding scheme.  
 Given the .63 measure of consistency observed for Survey 2 in Figure 1a (that is, on 
average, 2.22 of the 6 recalled canonical items in Survey 2 were inconsistent with what was 
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reported on Survey 1), one can reasonably state that the flashbulb memories of our participants 
after one year did not reflect to a notable degree what they reported in the first week.  This 
forgetting slowed in the next two years, with a decline of just .07 in the consistency score 
between Survey 2 and Survey 3.  The level of forgetting stabilized between the third and tenth 
year, with a non-significant improvement of .03 in consistency scores between Survey 3 and 
Survey 4.  We conducted a repeated-measures ANOVA with Time as a within-subject factor and 
the total consistency score as the dependent measure.  There was a main effect for Time, F(2, 
200) = 8.32, p < .001, np2 = .08.  In follow-up analyses, we found a significant difference 
between the total consistency scores for responses on Survey 2 and those reported on Survey 3, 
t(201) = 4.07, p < .001, d = .33, CI[.03,.09], but not between Survey 3 and Survey 4, t(201) = 
1.92, p = .06, d = .16, CI[-.07,.00].  Interestingly, the consistency scores on Survey 2 appear to 
be comparable to those reported by Kvavilashili et al. (2009) and Talarico and Rubin (2003), 
though exact comparison is difficult because the scoring procedures and probes differ across the 
three studies.  Kvavliashili et al., for instance, used Neisser and Harsch’s (1992) weighted 
average score, which could range from 0 to 7.  After three years, participants scored, as read 
from the graph they present, on average, approximately 5.00, or, if we used the top score as a 
denominator, a consistency score of approximately .71.  One difference between Neisser and 
Harsch’s scoring and ours is that we treat emotional response as equally important as the other 
canonical factors, but as shown by Hirst et al. (2009) and Koppel, Winkel, and Hirst (2014), 
consistency scores for emotional response can be quite low.  If we exclude emotional responses 
from the current calculations, we obtain a consistency score of .65 (SD = .24) for Survey 4.  It is 
unlikely that the stabilization between Surveys 3 and 4 probably is the result of a floor effect.  
People are more likely to forget, rather than remember, most of the events of their lives, 
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suggesting that a total consistency score around .60 after a ten-year retention interval would be 
considered high for most “ordinary” autobiographical memories. 
 In Conway et al. (1994), flashbulb memories were defined as any memory with no more 
than one inconsistency.  Although we used a different measure of consistency than Conway et 
al., we found that, for the Four-Survey sample, 30.2%, 24.35%, and 23.8% of the participants on 
Surveys 2, 3, and 4, respectively, had no more than one inconsistency (that is, had a consistency 
score of .83 or better).  We report the distribution of responses for Surveys 2 and 4 in Figure 2.  
The forgetting observed here is worse than Conway et al. found for their British participants 
remembering the resignation of Margret Thatcher (85.6% had scores indicating an exact memory 
for all but one of five attributes).  The difference between these two results may reflect different 
scoring procedures, different probes, or the exceptional nature of the Thatcher resignation.  We 
should note that Conway et al.’s treatment of flashbulb memories as accurate seems counter to 
both the use advanced by Brown and Kulik (1977) and by most researchers in the field, who are 
interested in the question of whether or not flashbulb memories are accurate.   
 Confidence.  We calculated the total confidence rating as the average of the confidence 
ratings associated with our six canonical features, as indicated by those who received the 
confidence-version of the survey (see Figure 1b).  Clearly, confidence remained high across the 
ten years.  Because we kept participants’ identifying information separate from the responses to 
the surveys, we could not ensure that we distributed the confidence version of the survey to the 
same participants on each subsequent round and consequently cannot use an ANOVA to 
compare confidence ratings across all waves of the survey.  For statistical purposes, then, we 
examined the subset of participants who happened to fill out the confidence version of both 
Surveys 2 and 4 and then a similar subset of participants who filled out the confidence version of 
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Surveys 3 and 4.  The means associated with these subsets were similar to those of the full 
sample reported in Figure 1a.  (The subset scores ranged from 4.23 to 4.63.)  We did not find a 
difference in confidence ratings of Surveys 2 and 4, t(49) = 1.21, p = .23, d = .19, CI[-.29,.07], 
and Surveys 3 and 4, t(38) = 1.9, p = .07, d = .12, CI[-.71. .02].  That confidence rating remained 
high even in the presence of fairly low consistency scores suggests that the confidence ratings 
participants assigned to their memories might not depend on the consistency of the memories.  
Focusing on Survey 4, we found that consistency scores and confidence ratings were not 
significantly correlated (r = .07, p = .50). 
 Event Memories.  Some of the questions we used to assess event memory (see Table 3) 
required more than one response to be “accurate,” for instance, participants had to state all three 
crash sites.  For each correctly named site, participants received .33 points.  For each incorrectly 
stated site, they lost .16 of a point.  Along the same lines, for the airline carrier names (there 
were two:  United and American), participants received .50 points for each correct answer and 
lost .25 points for each incorrect one.  When a score was less than zero, we reassigned it to have 
the value of zero.  As a result, scores were always from 0 to 1.  To obtain a score for the 
temporal ordering of events (Question 11 in Table 3), we calculated the Spearman rank order 
correlations between the respondent’s order and the actual order.  We then added one to the 
result and divided by two, thereby, again, obtaining a value from 0 to 1.  The total accuracy 
score was the averaged scores for the five probes. Although, for the flashbulb memories, we 
compared performance on Surveys 2 – 4 with performance on the baseline Survey 1, limiting our 
analysis to three testing periods, for event memories, we can and did determine the accuracy at 
all four testing periods (see Table 4). 
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 Like flashbulb memories for the reception of event information, accuracy scores for event 
details showed the most dramatic decline within a year and then stablized.  We conducted a 
repeated-measures ANOVA with Time as a within-subject factor and with the total Accuracy 
score as the dependent measure.  There was a main effect for Time, F(3, 199) = 31.67, p < .001, 
np2 = .32.  This main effect could be attributed solely to the drop in average performance from 
Survey 1 to Survey 2, t(201) = 8.50, p < .001, d = .65, CI[.08,.13]. 
We draw a distinction between critical and non-critical probes.  We exclude from this 
discussion the temporal order question (Question 11 in Table 2) because the sequence of events 
could have been predicted largely on common knowledge alone, e.g., a plane must have hit the 
World Trade Towers before the buildings collapsed.  Of the remaining four probes, two, our 
critical probes (number of planes, crash sites), are more central to the events of 9/11 than the 
other two, our non-critical probes (location of President Bush, names of airlines).  People usually 
do not tell their version of 9/11 without mentioning the number of planes or the crash sites.  On 
the other hand, people often omit the specific names of the airline carriers when talking about 
9/11.  Whether or not a plane was operated by United does not seem particularly pertinent to the 
issues likely to be of interest when remembering and/or discussing 9/11.  As for the location of 
Bush at the time of the attack, this detail also seems less central.  It is not included, for instance, 
in the Wikipedia account of the 9/11 attack (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/September_11_attacks).  
We asked 50 Mechanical Turk workers to rate on a scale of 1 to 7 how “critical” each of these 
facts were to any story one might tell about the 9/11 attack, with 1 being “not critical at all,” 7 
being “extremely critical.”  As Table 4 indicates, the crash sites were considered the most 
critical, followed by the number of planes, t(49) = 4.24, p < .001, d = .66.  Both these facts were 
more critical than the names of airline carriers, t(49) = 9.43, p < .001, d = 1.07, and t(49) = 7.47, 
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p < .001, d = 1.45, respectively, and the location of Bush, t(49) = 8.71, p < .001, d = 1.30, and 
t(49) = 4.50, p < .001, d = .66, respectively. 
The forgetting observed during the first year can be traced to the non-critical items 
(again, see Table 4).  In a 2 x 4 repeated measures ANOVA, with Element Type (Critical v Non-
critical) as one within-subject factor and Time as the other, there was a main effect of Element 
Type, F(1, 201) = 133.89, p < .001, np2 = .40, for Time, F(3, 199) = 33.69, p < .001, np2 = .35, 
and an interaction between Element Type and Time, F(3, 199) = 15.13, p < .001, np2 = .19.  The 
main effect of Element Type reflected the excellent retention of the critical items.   
In Table 4, one can also observe improvements in accuracy, which appear to arise 
because of external reminders.  First consider memory for the location of President Bush.  
Michael Moore’s film Fahrenheit 9/11 appeared three months prior to the distribution of Survey 
3.  In the film, Moore included a long, face-front video of President Bush looking quizzically 
into a camera after being told sotto voce by aide Andrew Card that a plane had crashed into the 
World Trade Center.  This segment of the Moore film was widely discussed.  Hirst et al. (2009) 
reported a marked increase in accuracy from Survey 2 to Survey 3 for the question about Bush’s 
location, with the improvement greater for those who saw the film than for those who did not, a 
finding replicated in the Four-Survey sample.  Did the improvement observed in Survey 3 persist 
over the next seven years?  We conducted a 2 x 2 ANOVA with Time as a within-subject factor 
(Survey 3 v Survey 4) and Seeing as a between-subject factor (Saw the Moore film v Did not see 
the film), excluding the six participants who did not answer on Survey 3 the question about 
seeing the Moore film.  The main effect for Seeing was marginally significant, F(1, 194) = 3.87, 
p = .05, np2 = .02.  Neither the main effects for Time nor the interaction were significant, F(1, 
194) = .43, p = .51, np2 = .00 and F(1, 201) = .43, p = .51, np2 = .00, respectively.  That is, the 
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Moore film not only refreshed people’s memories immediately after seeing the film, but also led 
to the retention of an accurate memory for at least the next seven years.  This finding on Survey 
4 was not the result of filling out Survey 3, in that the scores in the New sample did not differ 
significantly from those reported in Table 4 (p > .30). (New proportions:  .91 correct, for those 
who saw the film and .76 for those who did not). 
Released on April 29, 2006, five years before the distribution of Survey 4, the film 
United 93 also could potentially correct forgotten information, in this case, that United was an 
involved carrier.  Table 4 contains the proportion of participants who correctly listed United as 
one of the airline carriers involved in the attack as a function of whether or not the participant 
reported seeing the film.  If watching the film mattered, the accuracy scores concerning the name 
of the carrier should be, and was, greater for those who saw United 93 than for those who did 
not, but only for the time period after the film’s release (Using Fisher’s exact test, for Survey 4, p 
= .03; for Surveys 1 – 3, p > .30).  For those who saw the film, the difference in performance 
between Surveys 3 and 4 was marginally significant (McNemar’s test, p = .08).  There was no 
detectable difference for those who did not see the film.  The release of United 93 may not have 
improved the memory accuracy of those who failed to see the film, whereas the release of 
Fahrenheit 9/11 did, in part because there was not as much discussion about United 93 after its 
release as there was for Fahrenheit 9/11.  According to Lexus-Nexus, the number of mentions of 
Fahrenheit 9/11 in the New York Times one week after its release (27) was 3.38 times greater 
than the number of mentions of United 93 in the Times for a similar time period (8). 
Factors Affecting Performance 
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As in Hirst et al. (2009), we analyzed the following factors (see Table 3 for details about 
the surveys): (1) media attention, (2) ensuing conversation, (3) emotional intensity of the initial 
reaction, (4) residency at the time of the attack, and (5) personal loss and/or inconvenience.  
Flashbulb Memories.  Consistency.  Similar to Hirst et al. (2009), we found for Survey 4 
that consistency did not vary with any of five factors.  As Table 5 indicates, emotional intensity, 
media attention, and ensuing conversation did not correlate significantly with consistency. For 
residency (see Table 6), there was no significant difference between those who lived within the 
borders of New York City at the time of the attack and those who did not, t(200) = 1.06, p = .29. 
Other divisions, e.g., lived in Manhattan, the greater New York area, or below Canal Street, 
produced similar results.  As for personal loss and/or inconvenience, based on responses on 
Survey 1 to Questions 27 and 28 in Table 3, a participant was coded as experiencing a personal 
loss and/or inconvenience if they offered at least one concrete example, such as damage to home, 
loss of business, personal injury to self, friend, or relative, cancellation of school or work, and/or 
lack of food.  We did not include in this list psychological distress (e.g., felt anxious, lost 
appetite), although good arguments could be made for doing so.  Further details can be found in 
Hirst et al. (2009).  Despite the fact that participants seemed to be motivated to continue with the 
study if they had experienced personal loss and/or inconvenience, we found that this factor also 
did not affect consistency:  average consistency score for those who did experience personal loss 
and/or inconvenience, M = .59, SD = .21; those who did not, M = .61, SD = .20; t(200) = .79, p = 
.43. 
Bohannon, Gratz, and Cross (2007) argued that flashbulb memory consistency should be 
greater when the source of the news is a person rather than the media.  We divided our sample 
along these lines.  Participants were said to have as the source a person if they indicated that they 
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learned about the attack through a phone call, by word-of-mouth, or through email or Instant 
Messages.  They were said to have as a source the media if they indicated that they learned about 
it through TV, radio, or the Internet.  We did not consider in this analysis participants who 
indicated that they heard screams, sounds, sirens, or actually saw something.  The consistency of 
flashbulb memory across the ten-year period did not differ significantly with the source of the 
news (ps > .20). 
 Confidence ratings. Many of the factors affecting confidence ratings on Surveys 2 and 3, 
as reported in Hirst et al. (2009), no longer produced significant results in Survey 4, which we 
suspect is related to the decline in the factors’ importance over time.  We still found with the 
Four-Survey sample that confidence ratings were significantly correlated with (1) media 
attention and (2) ensuing conversation for Surveys 2 and 3. (Pearson Product-Moment 
Correlation between total confidence ratings on Survey 2 and media attention in the first year, r 
= .17; correlation between Survey 3’s confidence ratings and media attention in the first three 
years, r = .21.  Similar correlations now between total confidence ratings on Surveys 2 or 3 and 
ensuing conversation since the attack: S2, r = .16, S3, r = .18, in all instances, p < .01).  This 
result did not extend to the confidence ratings recorded on Survey 4.  As indicated in Table 5, by 
Survey 4, any evidence of a correlation between Survey 4’s confidence ratings and a variety of 
measures of media attention and ensuing conversation disappeared. 
As did Hirst et al. (2009), we also find, now with our Four-Survey sample, that 
confidence ratings varied as a function of personal loss and/or inconvenience in Surveys 2 and 3.  
By Survey 4, however, just as was the case for media attention and ensuing conversation, 
personal loss and/or inconvenience no longer had an effect on confidence (For Survey 4, 
Experienced loss:  M = 4.49, SD = .44; Did not: M = 4.58, SD = .38, t(89) = .94, p = .35).  As 
	   	   Ten-­‐Year	  Follow-­‐up	  	   28	  
Hirst et al. also found for Surveys 1 - 3, we did not find a significant correlation between 
confidence ratings, as measured in Survey 4, and emotional intensity (see Table 5).  Finally, 
although residency was not a factor for Surveys 2 and 3, we did find, for Survey 4, that those 
living in New York City reported greater confidence than those living outside the City, t(89) = 
3.21, p = .002, d = .75, CI[-.45, -.11] (see Table 6).  
Event Memory.  As did Hirst et al. (2009), we also found, now for Survey 4, that the 
level of media attention and ensuing conversation was correlated with the accuracy of event 
memory (see Table 5).  The amounts participants talked about the event in the first year 
following the attack and in the last seven years were also significantly correlated with the 
accuracy of event memory at the 10th year.  For media attention, it was only for the last seven 
years that there was a significant correlation with event accuracy.  Even highly significant and 
emotionally charged public events are not necessarily well retained simply because of how they 
are initially encoded; they benefit from rehearsal, as instigated through the media in this instance. 
The other factors – emotional intensity, residency, and personal loss and/or 
inconvenience -- did not yield significant results. The correlation between the level of emotional 
intensity and the accuracy of event memory on Survey 4 was not significant (Table 5).  It is 
noteworthy, that by Survey 4, emotional intensity no longer affected the level of media attention 
and ensuing conversation (see Table 7).  This non-significant correlation may have arisen 
because the level of emotional intensity declined over time.  The averaged emotional rating at the 
time of Survey 1 was 3.43 out of 5 (SD = .82); at the time of Survey 4, it was 2.54 (SD = .99).  
The limited opportunities to attend to media concerning 9/11 and the social disapproval that may 
exist about talking about 9/11 after so many years may also have contributed. 
	   	   Ten-­‐Year	  Follow-­‐up	  	   29	  
As for residency, unlike both Hirst et al. (2009) and Pezdek (2003), we found no 
significant effect for residency with our present Four-Survey sample.  We compared total 
accuracy scores for New Yorkers and non- New Yorkers on Surveys 1, 2, 3, and 4 and in each 
instance, using a t-test, did not find a significant difference (for all comparisons, p > .50; see 
Table 6). 
 Turning finally to personal loss and/or inconvenience, perhaps because the personal loss 
and/or inconvenience occurred ten years ago, it did not produce a significant difference in event 
memory accuracy on Survey 4 (Personal loss and/or inconvenience present: M = .84, SD = .16; 
Absent: M = .79, SD = .21, t(200) = 1.56, p = .21).  Hirst et al. (2009) suggested that they found 
an effect of personal loss and/or inconvenience on event memory because it influenced the level 
of media attention and ensuing conversation.  We examined its effect on these two factors, as 
well as current emotional intensity (see Table 8).  Only the ratings associated with the first week 
after the attack produced significant differences between those with or without personal loss 
and/or inconvenience on emotional intensity, media attention, and ensuing conversation, t(200) = 
2.21, p = .03, d = .33, CI[-.48, -.03]; t(200) = 2.25, p = .03, d = .35, CI[-.51, -.03]; t(1200) = 2.21, 
p = .03, d = .32, CI[-.43, -.02], respectively.  Of course, our definition of personal loss and/or 
inconvenience is broad.  Some participants who fell into this category had a close friend injured 
or killed, others’ personal loss and/or inconvenience was a temporary difficulty in getting to 
work.  Our sample was not large enough to make comparisons across types of personal 
loss/inconvenience.  
It should also be noted, that, contrary to Bohannon et al.’s (2007) suggestion that the 
source of the news affects event memory, for Survey 4, we found no difference in event memory 
accuracy when the source was a person and when it was a form of media (ps > .10).   
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Changes in Inconsistent or Inaccurate Memories 
 What changes occur to inconsistent or inaccurate memories over time?  Hirst et al. (2009) 
offered preliminary data that inconsistent flashbulb memories will be repeated, whereas 
inaccurate event memories will be corrected.  However, as already noted, for that report we had 
data from only a limited number of testing points – two in the case of flashbulb memories. This 
ten-year follow-up offers a chance to confirm or dispute the earlier suggestive findings. 
 Flashbulb Memories.  We identified the inconsistent memories on Survey 2 and 
calculated the proportion that were (1) corrected on Survey 3 or (2) repeated on Survey 3.  We 
then considered the extent to which these repeated inconsistencies in Survey 3 were, in turn, 
corrected or repeated on Survey 4. This latter calculation allowed us to determine whether the 
inconsistencies in Survey 2 persisted through Survey 3 into Survey 4.  By corrected, we mean 
that a previously inconsistent memory now conforms to what was reported on Survey 1.  (Of 
course, participants may respond with neither a correction nor a repetition, but some other 
alternative, which we treated as other.  Inasmuch as the proportion of corrected, repeated, and 
other responses add up to 1.0, we only report here results for corrected and repeated responses.) 
 As is clear in Figure 3, inconsistencies on Survey 2 were more likely to be repeated on 
Survey 3 rather than corrected, a result that replicates with the Four-Survey sample the findings 
of Hirst et al. (2009), t(148) = 2.73, p = .007, d = .23, CI[.04, .26].  More important, the 
inconsistent repeated memories of Survey 3 tended to continue to be repeated rather than be 
corrected on Survey 4, t(90) = 6.22, p < .001, d = 1.53, CI[.33, .65]. 
These results suggest that not only was a flashbulb memory becoming stable after the 
first year, as evidenced by the flattening of the forgetting curve after this time period, the 
emergent stable memory consisted of not just inconsistencies, but, to a remarkable extent, 
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repeated inconsistencies.  For instance, 43.4% of the inconsistencies on Survey 4 were 
repetitions of an inconsistency on Survey 3.  As the data we collected across surveys makes 
clear, this emergent stable, but not necessarily accurate memory begins to form by the first year.   
Table 9 contains some examples of repetitions.  Neisser and Harsh (1992) noted that 
many of the inconsistencies they observed involved temporal confusions (what they called “time 
slice errors”).  That is, the inconsistent memory referred to an event that might have occurred 
sometime around the time of the flashbulb-memory eliciting event, but did not occur at the time 
one learned of the event.  There may also be temporal errors (that is, confusions about the 
binding of temporal and other features of an event) in the examples in Table 9.  For instance, 
Participant 4 may have been in the office and on the street on September 11. The inconsistency 
arises because, when remembering, she may misattribute her location when she learned of the 
event to her location at some other time on the same day.  What is important is that once made, 
such temporal confusions and other source feature errors (e.g., Johnson et al., 1993) persisted 
over time. 
 Event Memories.  We calculated the proportion of corrections or repetitions from one 
survey to the next (Survey N to Survey N+1).  For the two items that required a single correct 
answer (number of planes, location of Bush), for repetitions, the numerator was the number of 
incorrect responses on Survey N that were repeated on Survey N + 1; for corrections, it was the 
number that were corrected.  The denominator in both instances was the number of incorrect 
responses on Survey N.  For the two items that required multiple responses to be correct (crash 
sites, carrier names), for repetitions, the numerator was the number of people that repeated an 
inaccurately remembered crash site or carrier name from Survey N, whereas the denominator 
was the number of participants who inaccurately remembered the crash site or carrier name on 
	   	   Ten-­‐Year	  Follow-­‐up	  	   32	  
Survey N.  We calculated these proportions for each possible erroneous crash site or carrier name 
and then summed over them.  Furthermore, we calculated the carrier names separately for 
United, in order to examine the effect of watching United 93.  For corrections, for crash sites, the 
numerator was the number of participants who failed to specify all three crash sites on Survey N 
that subsequently remembered at least one of the them on Survey N+1; the denominator, the 
number of participants who failed to specify all three crash sites on Survey N.  For carrier names, 
the numerator was the number of participants who failed to remember a specified carrier on N, 
but correctly remembered it on Survey N+1; the denominator was the number of participants 
who failed to specify an involved airline carrier on Survey N. 
 We cannot easily compare “repeated” and “corrected” proportions in most instances 
because their denominators differ.  We can examine whether the level of corrections and 
repetitions changed over time, and whether corrections and/or repetitions differed from chance.  
If one was above chance, whereas the other was below chance, we might safely assume that they 
differed. We adopt the simplifying assumption that chance is .50, for instance, that there is an 
equal chance that an inconsistency will be repeated as opposed to not repeated, or will be 
corrected as opposed to not corrected.  The exact value of chance is not germane to the 
comparison we plan to make, only whether different measures differed from the prespecified 
measure of chance.  For instance, we can assert that the pattern of corrections changed over time 
if, for instance, the proportion of corrections went from below chance to chance levels.  Different 
estimates of chance would yield similar patterns of change.  
Consider first the critical facts – the number of planes and the crash sites.  Given their 
pervasive presence in most accounts of 9/11, we would expect that, unlike what we found for 
flashbulb memories, inaccurate recollections on one survey should likely be corrected on the 
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next survey.  As Table 10 indicates, across all four surveys, corrections were indeed more 
frequent than repetitions for both critical items.  In all instances, repetitions were below chance 
(based on the reasoning in the previous paragraph and using the binominal test), whereas 
corrections were above chance, p < .001. 
 As for the non-critical facts, first, consider the overall scores associated with the location 
of Bush.  Prior to the release of the film (which happened shortly before Survey 3), repetitions 
were more likely than corrections, with the latter quite rare.  As a result, on Survey 2, for both 
those who saw the film and those who did not, repetitions were at chance level, p > .20, and 
corrections were below chance, p < .001 (relevant data are in the columns labeled “Wrong on 
Survey 1, Modified on Survey 2”).  Immediately after the release of the film, corrections now 
dominated, with repetitions markedly declining.  Thus, for the responses on Survey 3, for those 
who saw it, corrections were now above chance, p < .005, whereas repetitions were below 
chance level, p < .001.  For those who did not see the film, corrections were now at chance 
levels, p > .20, whereas repetitions were below chance, p < 001.  As noted already, the film 
probably had an effect even for those who did not see it because the notorious segment involving 
Bush’s classroom performance was replayed and discussed in many outlets.  As of Survey 4, the 
impact of the film faded, and repetitions were more common.  For those who had not seen the 
film, repetitions were now more frequent than corrections.  For those who saw the film, 
corrections shifted from above chance on Survey 3 to below chance on Survey 4, p < .001, 
whereas repetitions remained below chance, p > .01.  For those who did not see the film, on 
Survey 4, corrections went from chance levels to below chance, p <.01, whereas repetitions went 
from below chance to chance levels, p > .20.   
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 Similar effects were observed for the film United 93, which came out between Surveys 3 
and 4.  The overall correction rate remained below chance on Surveys 2 through 4, p < .01.  
However, for those who saw the film, correction rates went from below chance level on Surveys 
2 and 3, p < .01, to chance levels on Survey 4, p = .38.  They remained below chance levels 
across surveys for those who did not see the film, p < .01. 
General Discussion 
 The study of flashbulb memories and associated event memories provides an opportunity 
to study how “real world” events are remembered over an extended period of time.  A clear 
picture emerges in this paper. 
Forgetting and Confidence 
 Although participants clearly formed flashbulb memories of the reception of information 
about the 9/11 attack, in that they reported an elaborate recollection even after ten years (Brown 
& Kulik, 1977), they nevertheless experienced forgetting, in the sense that they no longer 
remembered the original reception event as they initially reported it.  Forgetting in this sense 
occurred mainly in the first year and then leveled off, so that no change in memory performance 
was detectable between Years 3 and 10.  Our results differ from Schmolck et al. (2000), who 
found that memory continued to decline over time.  As we noted in the Introduction, one might 
argue that we did not find increasing memory distortions for flashbulb memories in our three-
year report because we did not have a long enough retention interval.  This concern becomes less 
reasonable when considering the present ten-year follow-up.  Our findings for event memories 
were similar to those we presented for flashbulb memories:  rapid forgetting the first year, 
without any increase in the levels of forgetting thereafter. 
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Our results, as well as those of others (including Schmolck et al, 2000), also 
demonstrated what appears to be a characteristic feature of flashbulb memories – the high 
confidence with which they are held, even with marked levels of forgetting.  A delay of ten years 
did not diminish participants’ extraordinarily high level of confidence in their flashbulb 
memories.  We did not follow the procedure of Talarico and Rubin and ask for a memory of an 
“ordinary” autobiographical event around the time of the 9/11 attack, but their work showed a 
steady decline in confidence over a 32-week period for “ordinary” autobiographical memories.  
There is no a priori reason to doubt that this decline would have continued for at least some of 
the next nine years. 
Factors Affecting Consistency, Confidence, and Accuracy 
Consistency of Flashbulb Memories.  None of our five factors -- media attention, 
ensuing conversation, residency, personal loss and/or inconvenience, and emotional intensity – 
had an influence on flashbulb memory consistency.  In retrospect, this outcome may not be 
surprising.  There are no doubt multiple roots to consistency.  The naturalistic nature of this 
study does not allow us to isolate one over the others easily.  For example, although there is a 
substantial experimental literature indicating that emotionally evocative stimulus material is 
often remembered better than emotionally neutral material, there is also evidence that emotion 
may reduce source memory by disrupting the binding among features of items (e.g., an 
emotional picture with its location, Mather, Mitchell, Raye et al., 2006; see Kensinger, 2009; 
Mather & Sutherland, 2011; Phelps, 2004; Reisberg & Heuer, 2004, for reviews and further 
discussion).  How the various affecting the impact of emotion on memory interact in the present 
instance may depend on how our participants were memorizing and remembering the reception 
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event.  In the laboratory, we could try to control for individual differences in strategy.  We 
cannot do so in the present instance. 
 Confidence Ratings.  At least for the first three years, confidence was influenced by 
media attention and ensuing conversation.  That this effect holds for assessment of media 
attention and ensuring conversation across this time period suggests that confidence ratings are a 
function of what occurs subsequent to the time the event is initially encoded, as well as what 
occurs at the time of the initial encoding.  This effect of media attention and ensuing 
conversation appears to have on confidence ratings may be based on the subjective 
characteristics of a memory, such as its perceptual or emotional vividness (see Johnson & 
Multhaup, 1992, for a discussion of the role of subjective characteristics).  Presumably, they 
elicit rehearsals or remindings of the reception event, which, in turn, maintain or increase the 
vividness of the memory’s subjective qualities (e.g., Suengas & Johnson, 1988).  Metamemory 
judgments may also come into play (Johnson & Raye, 2000). For example, people may believe 
that if they attended to the media or talked about 9/11 a lot, they must have good memories of the 
event and the circumstances in which they learned about the event.  Consequently, as their media 
attention and ensuing conversations increases, so does their confidence.  As to the failure to find 
an effect after ten years, people simply may not have been attending to the media or talking 
about 9/11 enough for them to affect either the subjective characteristics of the memory or 
metamemory judgments, and, in turn, the level of confidence. 
Our finding for Survey 4 that people who lived in New York at the time of the attacks 
gave higher ratings to their confidence in their reception memories than non-New Yorkers is 
consistent with the idea that metacognitive factors affect confidence about memories for 
reception details.  Echterhoff and Hirst (2006), for instance, argued from a study that 
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manipulated ease of retrieval that people may assign confidence ratings based on their social 
expectations concerning what they should or should not remember.  New Yorkers may believe 
that they should, as those most directly affected, remember the circumstances in which they 
learned of 9/11 and, hence, on the basis of this belief assign a high level of confidence to their 
memory.  A better understanding of the relation between factors that affect confidence and those 
that affect consistency is needed. 
Event Memory. The accuracy of event memory was associated with high levels of media 
attention and ensuing conversation.  These variables, especially media attention, likely increase 
accuracy because they help correct inaccurate memories and provide occasions for rehearsing 
accurate memories.  
Factors Affecting Recollection 
The above discussion focuses on consistency and accuracy, but, as argued, it is also 
important to consider whether or not someone recollects the reception event, regardless of the 
consistency of what was recollected.  As already noted, in all but one case, participants reported 
recollections of the six probed-for canonical features.  These recollections were accompanied by 
a high confidence rating.  In Survey 2, 94.6% of the total confidence ratings were greater than or 
equal to 3.5 out of 5; 74.3% of the total confidence rating were greater than or equal to 4 out of 
5.  For Survey 4, comparable percentages were 96.0% and 86.7%%, respectively.  The factors 
influencing the high levels of confidence could be viewed as the factors establishing whether or 
not people form and maintain a flashbulb memory, irrespective of its accuracy. 
Our results indicate that, for the first three years, media attention and ensuing 
conversation led to increased confidence and hence a preserved “memory” of the reception 
event.  Finkenhauer et al.’s (1998) emotional-integrative model of flashbulb memories provides a 
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cue as to why that might be so (for related models, see Conway, 1995).  Their model is relevant 
to Brown and Kulik’s interest in recollection per se, as opposed to consistency, because, in their 
original study, they distributed a survey that examined memories for the death of King Baudouin 
of Belgium only 7 to 8 months after the death, thereby assessing only claims about remembering, 
not the consistency of reported memories.  Their model suggests that that thinking about the 
event itself will lead to better “memory” for the reception event.  One need only assume that 
media attention and ensuing conversation led to rehearsal of the event itself to make a connection 
between our results and Finkenhauer et al. 
Changes in Memories 
The presence or absence of external influences also accounts for differences in the way 
flashbulb and event memories change over time.  External reminders are present for event 
memories, and hence, in the case of the media coverage of 9/11 in the United States, corrections 
prevailed.  Of course, external reminders vary as to their prevalence.  Certain facts about 9/11, 
what we referred to as critical facts, are probably included in almost every public account of the 
events of 9/11.  As a result, memory accuracy was high from the beginning and remained high 
for critical facts.  This high level of performance limited the chance for corrections over time, 
because inaccuracies are rare.  However, we found that when errors did occur, there was a 
marked tendency to correct them in future recollections.   
As to non-critical facts, these facts do not surface frequently in accounts of 9/11. This 
may reflect both political and social influences on the way the media depicts events and the way 
the public conceptualizes them.  Whatever the explanation of why a fact is treated as non-critical, 
because of their relative infrequency, event memory for non-critical facts declined over time, that 
is, until an external influence provided a source for possible correction.  Why an external 
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influence suddenly emerges may again be a matter of political and social considerations.  Once it 
does, as with the release of Fahrenheit 9/11 or United 93, people exposed to these external 
influences, begin to correct their errors.  Once a correction was made, the now accurate memory 
tended to remain accurate. 
While corrections might characterize the change occurring in event memories over time, 
repetition characterizes the change associated with flashbulb memories, and even event memory 
if there is no external influence.  The reason is clear:  There is likely a paucity of external 
reminders when it comes to flashbulb memories.  Between the time of the attack and the first 
year, people appeared to have formed a memory of the circumstances in which they learned of 
the event and this memory became their story, regardless of any errors it might include.  Of 
course, subsequent discussion with others who might have been with a participant as the time 
that information about the attack was received could “correct” erroneous elements, but we have 
no way of assessing the extent to which this factor might come into play in the present study.   
The Special Nature of Flashbulb Memories 
As we noted in the introduction, psychologists study flashbulb memories in part because 
they seem relevant not just to long long-term retention, but to two additional topics of general 
import:  memory for trauma and the way in which they allow the personal and public to intersect.  
How do our present findings bear on these two topics? 
Flashbulb Memories and Trauma.  The emotionally charged nature of flashbulb 
memories makes them an ideal vehicle for studying traumatic memories, especially if the 
flashbulb-memory-inducing event is negatively valenced.  Of course, flashbulb memories and 
their associated event memories have two distinctive characteristics that differentiate them from 
other traumatic memories.  First, almost by definition, they involve learning about an 
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emotionally charged event rather than directly experiencing the event, as a soldier might when 
seeing a comrade killed in battle.  Second, the trauma associated with flashbulb memories is 
collective, whereas many of the traumas associated with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) 
happen to one or at most a few people at any time, as is the case for the soldiers’ battle 
experience.  Nevertheless, people can manifest many of the symptoms of PTSD following even 
indirect exposure to a traumatic event (Galea et al., 2002).  Moreover, the collective nature of 
flashbulb memories provides an advantage for those psychologists inclined to employ a multiple 
participant methodology, as opposed to case studies. 
The present work suggests that the account of a traumatic event, which is 
autobiographical in nature, may become stable over time, even if it does not reflect what 
happened.  That is, erroneous traumatic memories may become resistant to forgetting over time.  
To be sure, correction is possible, but, as we noted, the opportunities for correction of 
autobiographical memories are often limited.  This claim, however, is at best suggestive.  One 
reason flashbulb memories may resist forgetting at some point is that they have become highly 
rehearsed and perhaps highly detailed and structured accounts.  Some traumatic memories, 
however, may not have such features (Brewin & Holmes, 2003, but see Rubin, 2011).  Clearly, 
the present work speaks to the need for more work on the long long-term memory of trauma. 
Flashbulb Memories and History.  As Neisser (1982) noted, the event associated with a 
flashbulb memory and the flashbulb memories themselves constitute one of the few times during 
people’s lives that they feel that they are part of history.  To a large extent, people’s personal 
lives unfold locally and within a small social sphere.  When an event such as the assassination of 
John F. Kennedy or the attack of 9/11 occurs, the personal timeline of one’s life and the 
historical time line of a nation intersect.  Autobiographical memories – in this instance, 
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memories of the circumstances of learning of the event – and collective memories – in this 
instance, memories the public holds of the precipitating event – become intricately intertwined.  
As a result, the study of flashbulb memories bears critically on issues of social identity 
(Bernsten, 2008; Curci, Luminet, Finkenauer, & Gisle, 2001) and the formation of collective 
memory (Conway, 1997; Hirst & Meksin, 2008). 
Although the present work suggests that autobiographical flashbulb memories and 
collective event memory both become stable over time, somewhere between the third and tenth 
year, it also underscores that different factors drive their formation and retention.  For instance, 
autobiographical memories appear to be shaped largely by individual factors affecting both 
memorizing and remembering (e.g., Johnson, 2006).  Moreover, as they stablize, they can be 
formed around inconsistent as well as consistent recollections.  Erroneous, as well as accurate, 
memories are repeated over time. 
Collective event memories also become stabilized over time, but errors may be more 
likely to be corrected rather than maintained, at least “corrected” along the lines of what an 
external influence specifies.  Whereas the autobiographical memories might reflect to a 
substantial degree the psychological dynamics of individuals (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; 
Gordon, Franklin, & Beck, 2005; Mather & Carstensen, 2005; but see Nelson & Fivush, 2004; 
Pillemer, 2009; Wang, 2013) collective event memories rest to a larger degree on the dynamics 
of social practices and artifacts (Hirst & Meksin, 2008; Olick, Vinitzky-Serouss, & Levy, 2011).  
People remember events as these social practices and artifacts appear to dictate.  Of course, 
individual psychological dynamics may affect memory for public events, for example, one’s 
expertise, motivations and available schemas may affect how media accounts are processed.  
Moreover, social practices and artifacts may shape memories for personal autobiographical 
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events, as the literature on cultural effects on autobiographical memories indicates (Wang, 2013).  
Similarities and differences in the dynamics underlying the formation and retention of 
autobiographical flashbulb memories and the more collective memories held of the public event 
itself are an intriguing domain for future research. 
Conclusions 
  Although participants continued to report elaborate recollections of reception details 
over the ten years, participants should a considerable level of inconsistency in their long-term 
retention.  There was considerable initial forgetting over the first year.  The level of 
inconsistency remains fairly stable thereafter.  Interestingly, the inconsistent flashbulb memories 
observed in Survey 1 were repeated from Survey 2 to Survey 3 and then in Survey 4.  Memories 
for the events of the 9/11 attack also showed initial forgetting, especially of non-critical details in 
the first year.  Now, however, external influences, such as the films Fahrenheit 9/11 and United 
93, led to corrections.  Also important was the contribution of media attention and ensuing 
conversation to event memory accuracy and confidence ratings, at least for the first three years. 
Of course, external influences can do more than correct erroneous memories.  They can 
also do the reverse: create erroneous memories (e.g., Johnson, 2007).  Hirst and Fineberg (2012), 
for instance, discussed the role of external influences in the creation of a false memory around 
the sacrifice of two Flemish brothers during World War I, a false memory that has become a 
patriotic and widely accepted symbol for the Flemish nationalist movement.  In a more 
experimental setting, Butler, Zaromb, Lyle, & Roediger (2009) showed that historical films can 
produce memory distortions if they contain historically inaccurate material.  In the case of 9/11, 
however, at least for the facts we explored, external influences corrected memories rather than 
distorted them. 
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 External influences shape the content of memory through the effects of rehearsal, social 
contagion, and socially shared retrieval-induced forgetting, among other possibilities (see Hirst 
& Echterhoff, 2012, for a review).  The frequent repetition of facts in the media and in 
conversations clearly contributed to the leveling off of forgetting.  Whether the same “rehearsal” 
effect could account for the stabilization of flashbulb memories is uncertain, inasmuch as the 
questions we asked about ensuing conversations were not sensitive enough to address this issue.  
However, Suengas and Johnson (1988) demonstrated the role of overt and covert rehearsal in 
maintaining the subjective qualities of memories for laboratory-established “mini-events.”   
Bahrick (1984) suggested that still-remembered memories are placed into “permastore.”  
Something like this may be happening here as well; however, in developing his theory, Bahrick 
and colleagues focused on the retention of accurate memories, for example, if participants 
accurately remembered the name of a street after six years, they remembered it for the long-term. 
A more straightforward account of the retention of inconsistencies we report here might include 
the idea that both true and false memories are attributions based on qualitative characteristics of 
mental experiences and reasoning and metamemory assumptions  (Johnson & Raye, 1981; 
Johnson et al., 1993), as well as Neisser’s reframing of the notion of permastore.  As Neisser 
(1982) argued, a sharp resistance to forgetting may develop as a memory consolidates around a 
highly structured, redundant representation, or in our case, around a story about both learning of 
9/11 and the event itself.  Inconsistencies that “make sense” then can be folded into the evolving 
rendering of 9/11 and, as a consequence, remain as part of the representation.  This possibility 
might be particularly powerful for “time slice errors,” in that the inconsistency actually occurred 
and hence may fit well into any evolving story.  Also, source feature misattributions among 
actual events may be even more likely than importing imagined details because of their more 
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detailed and vivid characteristics (Lyle & Johnson, 2006).  Of course, there likely are a variety of 
factors contributing to how memories become stable.  Our point is that if one or more of these 
are present, stability, whether involving accurate or inaccurate memories, is likely to occur. 
The flashbulb and event memories we observed after a 10-year retention interval reflect 
both the build-up of mnemonic stability and the corrective function of external influences.  These 
dual effects map, at least to some degree, onto two mnemonic mechanisms of interest to 
cognitive psychologists and neuroscientists:  strengthening and construction/reconstruction 
(sometimes referred to as consolidation and reconsolidation; see Dudai, 2012; Nader & Hardt, 
2009).  Strengthening/consolidation involves processes by which a memory is transformed into a 
long-term representation that becomes insensitive to interference (Dudai, 2012). The leveling off 
of forgetting that we observed may reflect the final end of this strengthening/consolidation 
process. Construction/reconstruction/reconsolidation refer to phenomena associated with 
memory malleability.  External influences, particularly as reflected in the memory practices of a 
community (Hirst & Manier, 2009), may lead to the corrections we observed, even after a 
substantial period of consolidation, because of this feature of memory. 
Our research underscores the need to consider both mechanisms.  It is only by 
considering both that one can understand why something as seemingly unforgettable as the 9/11 
attack can produce long-held stable memories with marked inconsistencies.  We may recollect 
the events of 9/11 with great confidence over an extremely long period of time.  That longevity 
might speak to the stability of the memory, but it does not ensure its accuracy. 
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Distribution of Sample for Those Who Completed One or More Surveys, Including Survey 4 
 Recruitment location at the time of the first survey  













1, 2, 3, 4 0 22 99 31 35 7 8  202 
1, 4 0 4 23 7 3 1 1  39 
2, 4 0 7 26 8 0 8 2  51 
3, 4 0 18 73 30 2 0 0  123 
1, 2, 4 0 7 29 9 2 12 3  62 
1, 3, 4 0 0 18 7 1 0 2  28 
2, 3, 4 0 17 58 17 3 0 3  98 
4 only 0 0 62 41 0 0 0 311 414 
No 
Match 
        104 
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 Table	  2	  
Proportion	  of	  participants	  in	  the	  Four-­Survey	  Sample	  and	  the	  New	  Sample	  Fitting	  Designated	  
Categories1	  
	   	   Four-­Survey	   New	  
Gender	   Female	   .72	   .60	  	   Male	   .28	   .33	  
Ethnicity/Race	   White	   .83	   .66	  	   Black	   .01	   .02	  	   Asian	   .03	   .02	  	   Hispanic	   .02	   .02	  	   East/American	  Indian	   .00	   .01	  	   Mixed	   .04	   .05	  
Religion	   Christian	   .45	   .40	  	   Jewish	   .18	   .06	  	   Muslim	   .01	   .01	  	   Buddhist	   .02	   .01	  	   Atheist	   .04	   .07	  	   Agnostic	   .03	   .04	  	   Other	   .07	   .05	  	   None	   .10	   .14	  
Politics	   Extreme/Moderate	  Left	   .67	   .42	  	   Center	   .05	   .06	  	   Extreme/Moderate	  Right	   .12	   .15	  	   Independent	   .05	   .09	  	   Other	   .01	   .01	  	   None	   .03	   .04	  
Student2	   Yes	   .52	   .24	  	   No	   .48	   .69	  	  Notes.	  	  1	  –	  Figures	  do	  not	  always	  add	  up	  to	  1.00	  because	  some	  participants	  opted	  not	  to	  respond	  to	  some	  or	  all	  the	  demographic	  queries.	  2	  –	  Figures	  for	  Student	  Status	  are	  for	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  attack	  for	  the	  Four-­‐Survey	  Sample,	  at	  the	  time	  of	  filling	  out	  the	  survey	  for	  the	  New	  Sample.	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Questions	  on	  the	  Surveys	  Relevant	  to	  Current	  Analyses	  
FLASHBULB MEMORY 
(The six canonical features; Asked on all four surveys) 
 
1) How did you first learn about it (what was the source of the information)? 
2) Where were you? 
3) What were you doing? 
4) How did you feel when you first became aware of the attack? 
5) Who was the first person with whom you communicated about the attack? 
6) What were you doing immediately before you became aware of the attack? 
 
EVENT	  MEMORY	  (The	  five	  facts;	  Asked	  on	  all	  four	  surveys)	  
7) How many airplanes were involved in the attack? 
8) What airline or airlines had planes hijacked?  How many from each airline? 
9) In the vicinity of which cities did the airplanes end up? 
10) Where was President Bush when the attack occurred? 
11)  Many people think that these are the most salient events that occurred in the attack: 
a) The Pentagon was hit by a hijacked plane 
b) A second World Trade Center Tower was hit by a hijacked plane 
c) A World Trade Center Tower collapsed 
d) A World Trade Center Tower was hit by a hijacked plane 
e) A second World Trade Center Tower collapsed 
f) A hijacked plane crashed outside of Pittsburgh 
Please indicate the order in which you became aware of each event. 
Please indicate the order in which the events actually occurred. 
 
FACTORS	  AFFECTING	  PERFORMANCE	  
Emotional Intensity (As	  the	  questions	  appeared	  in	  Survey	  4)	  
For	  the	  following	  questions,	  we’d	  like	  you	  to	  tell	  us	  about	  your	  CURRENT	  FEELINGS	  
CONCERNING	  THE	  ATTACK.	  	  Please	  indicate	  your	  response	  by	  marking	  the	  appropriate	  point	  
on	  the	  scales	  provided.	  	  Note	  that	  you	  may	  indicate	  partial	  numbers	  (e.g.	  3.5)	  [Scale	  was	  from	  
1	  (low)	  to	  5	  (high).]	  
12) At this moment, how strongly or intensely do you feel sad about the attack? 
13) At this moment, how strongly or intensely do you feel angry about the attack? 
14) At this moment, how strongly or intensely do you feel fear about the attack? 
15) At this moment, how strongly or intensely do you feel confusion about the attack? 
16) At this moment, how strongly or intensely do you feel frustration about the attack? 
17) At this moment, how strongly or intensely do you feel shock about the attack? 
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For	  the	  following	  questions,	  we’d	  like	  you	  to	  tell	  us	  about	  your	  FEELINGS	  CONCERNING	  9/11	  
IN	  THE	  TWO	  WEEKS	  FOLLOWING	  THE	  ATTACK.	  	  Please	  indicate	  your	  response	  by	  marking	  
the	  appropriate	  point	  on	  the	  scales	  provided.	  	  Note	  that	  you	  may	  indicate	  partial	  numbers	  
(e.g.	  3.5)	  [Scale	  was	  from	  1	  (low)	  to	  5	  (high).]	  
18) How strongly or intensely did you feel sad about the attack? 
19) How strongly or intensely did you feel angry about the attack? 
20) How strongly or intensely did you feel fear about the attack? 
21) How strongly or intensely did you feel confusion about the attack? 
22) How strongly or intensely did you feel frustration about the attack? 
23) How strongly or intensely did you feel shock about the attack? 
 
Media coverage 
(As the question appeared in Survey 4) 
 
24) In the last seven years, how closely have you followed media coverage about 9/11? [Rate on 
a scale of 1 (very little) – 5 (very much).] 
 
Ensuing Conversation 
(As the question appeared in Survey 4) 
 
25) In the last seven years, how much have you talked about 9/11? [Rate on a scale of 1 (very 
little) – 5 (very much).] 
 
Residency 
(In our analyses, we use the response on Survey 1) 
 
26) Where do you consider home? 
 
Personal Loss and/or Inconvenience 
(In our analyses, we use the response on Survey 1) 
 
27) Did you suffer any personal losses in the attack?  If so, please specify. 
28) Did the attack inconvenience your daily activities in some way?  If so, please specify. 
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Table 4 
Criticality and Accuracy Scores for Four Aspects of the Event Memory for 9/11, Compared 
Across Four Surveys 




   Survey 1 Survey 2 Survey 35 Survey 45 
Critical      
Number of Planes 5.59 (1.58) .95 (.22) .89 (.32) .86 (.35) .88 (.33) 
Crash Sites 6.46 (.90) .95 (.14) .94 (.17) .90 (.24) .89 (.21) 
Non-critical      
Location of Bush 4.12 (1.74)     
 Saw Moore  .89 .59 .90 .87 
 Did Not See  .90 .62 .80 .80 
 Bush Overall  .90 .60 .85 .83 
Airline Names 3.69 (1.99)     
 United Alone1      
    Saw United 93  .93 .69 .59 .76 
    Did Not See  .85 .63 .54 .52 
    United Overall2  .86 .64 .54 .55  
 Airline Overall3  .88 (.28) .75 (.37) .59 (.42) .56 (.42) 
      
Temporal Order -------------- .89 (.12) .83 (.23) .83 (.23) .89 (.10) 








1.  Scores based on proportion of participants who correctly recalled United Airline. 
2.  Includes the five participants who did not report whether they did or did not see United 93. 
3.  Scores based on proportion of participants who correctly recalled both American and United. 
4.  Using a 1 – 7 scale. 
5.  Fahrenheit 9/11 was released 3 months before the distribution of Survey 3; United 93, 5 years 
before the distribution of Survey 4.  105 participants reported watching Fahrenheit 9/11 on 
Survey 3; 29 participants reported watching United 93 on Survey 4. 
 
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
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Table 5 
Correlations between Memory Assessments (FBM Consistency, FBM Confidence, and Event 
Memory) and Factors Affecting Performance (Emotional Intensity, Media Attention, and 
Ensuing Conversation).  Correlations are between Memory Assessments on Survey 4 and Factor 
Measures on Surveys 1 through 4.    
   Temporal Period in which Factors Were Measured 
Memory 
Assessment 







Years 1 and 3) 
Survey 4 
(Between Years 3 and 10) 
Flashbulb Memory 
(Consistency) 
     
 Emotional 
Intensity 




      
 Media 
Attention 
 .02 .01 .02 -.10 
 Ensuing 
Conversation 
 -.10 .03 .01 -.10 
Flashbulb Memory 
(Confidence) 
     
 Emotional 
Intensity 
 -.04 -.07 -.02 -.04 
 Media 
Attention 
 -.09 -.01 -.01 .04 
 Ensuing 
Conversation 
 .01 .07 -.01 .03 
Event Memory (Accuracy)      
 Emotional 
Intensity 
 -.04 -.05 -.02 -.06 
 Media 
Attention 
 .09 .13 .08 .16* 
 Ensuing 
Conversation 
 .10 .19** .05 .20** 
 
Notes. 
* -  p < .05 
** -  p < .01 
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Table 6 
Consistency of Flashbulb Memories, Confidence in Flashbulb Memories, and Accuracy of Event 
Memories as a Function of Residence, Across All Surveys 
  Residence 






   
 Survey 2 .60 (.18) .64 (.19) 
 Survey 3 .56 (.24) .57 (.13) 




   
 Survey 2 4.52 (.68) 4.41 (.59) 
 Survey 3 4.32 (.99) 4.24 (.88) 




   
 Survey 1 .91 (.12) .91 (.11) 
 Survey 2 .83 (.19) .78 (.19) 
 Survey 3 .82 (.20) .80 (.22) 
 Survey 4 .84 (.17) .79 (.21) 
 
Note.  Standard deviations in parentheses.   
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Table 7 
Correlations between Averaged Emotional Intensity (EI) and Either Media Attention (MA) or 
Ensuing Conversation (EC) 





(Between Yrs 1 and 3) 
Survey 4 




MA EC MA EC MA EC MA EC 
S1 .14 .15* .15* .21** .16* .13 -.03 .04 
S2 .09 .11 .28** .32** .24** .23** -.03 -.01 
S3 .11 .14 .22** .27** .27** .25** -.04 -.02 
S4 .12 .11 .19** .18* .17* .15* -.02 -.02 
 
Notes.  Emotional intensity was measured at the time the survey was filled out, not when one 
first learned about the attack.  Media Attention and Ensuing Conversation refer to the amount of 
attention or conversing during the indicated time period (e.g., between years 1 and 3). 
Highlighted figures are those of most interest.  The top row represents the correlations between 
emotional intensity in the first week and subsequent media attention over the next ten years, 
indicating the impact of the initial emotional intensity and subsequent media attention and 
ensuing conversation.  Figures on the diagonal examine, for example, the impact of emotional 
intensity at the end of the year and the amount of media attention and ensuing conversation in the 
last year. 
* - p < .05 
** - p < .01 
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Table 8 
The Effect of Personal Loss and/or Inconvenience on Current Emotional Intensity, Media 
Attention, and Ensuing Conversation, as rated on Surveys 1 – 4 
  Survey 1 Survey 2 Survey3 Survey 4 
Emotional Intensity     
 With Personal Loss 3.57 (.75) 2.88 (.98) 2.77 (.99) 2.56 (1.00) 
 Without 3.31 (.83) 2.77 (.86) 2.75 (.79) 2.41 (.95) 
Media Attention     
 With Personal Loss 4.47 (.64) 3.49 (1.02) 3.14 (1.39) 3.25 (1.06) 
 Without 4.20 (.90) 3.46 (1.07) 3.33 (1.27) 2.97 (1.15) 
Ensuing Conversation     
 With Personal Loss 4.52 (.57) 3.72 (1.09) 3.08 (1.32) 2.82 (1.05) 
 Without  4.30 (.77) 3.49 (1.00) 3.19 (1.11) 2.65 (.90) 
 
Note:  Standard deviations in parentheses. 
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Table 9 
Examples of Repeated Inconsistencies Across Four Surveys, for Four Different Participants 
Participant 1:  Where, What Doing 
S1:  Kitchen, making breakfast 
S2:  In dorm room, folding laundry 
S3:  Ironing in dorm room 
S4:  In dorm room, ironing 
Participant 2:  First Communication 
S1:  Told a fellow biker who I intercepted as 
she approached the bridge.  I told her to turn 
and go home. 
S2:  A fellow biker who was watching with 
me. 
S3:  I communicated with a guy watching 
next to me. 
S4:  The person next to me.  I don’t know 
him. 
Participant 3:  How learned about 
S1:  Today Show 
S2:  Girl in dorm rushed in my room and 
told me 
S3:  Girl came into my dorm room and told 
me 
S4:  A girl came into my room and told me 
to come quickly 
Participant 4:  Where 
S1:  I was sitting in my office 
S2:  I was standing on the street 
S3:  Standing near the office on the street 
S4:  Near the office 
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Table 10 
Proportion of Repetitions and Corrections of Incorrectly Remembered Facts about 9/11 
 Wrong on  Survey 1 Survey 2 Survey 3 
 Changed 
on 
Survey 2 Survey 3 Survey 4 
 Type of 
Change 
Repeated Corrected Repeated Corrected Repeated Corrected 
Critical        
Crash Site  .15 .85  .29 .76 .25 .77 
Number of 
Planes 
 .20 .60 .00 .88 .26 .92 
Non-Critical        
Carrier 
Names 
       
 AA   .42  .28  .27 
 United   .36  .26  .35 
  Saw 
United 
93 
  .27  .22  .58 
  Did 
not 
  .42  .27  .33 
 Wrong 
Carrier 
 .35  .11  .23  
Bush’s 
Location 




 .58 .12 .28 .73 .39 .32 
 Did 
Not 
 .40 .10 .35 .54 .57 .31 
 
	   	   Ten-­‐Year	  Follow-­‐up	  	   69	  
  
 
Figure 1.  Consistency and Confidence.  Figure 1a.  Consistency score of flashbulb 
memories, as averaged over six canonical features, for responses on Surveys 2, 3, and 4, 
with Survey 1 serving as baseline.  Figure 1b. Confidence ratings averaged over the six 
canonical features, for responses on Surveys 2, 3, and 4.  Ratings were on a 1 – 5 scale, 
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  Figure	  2.	  	  Number	  of	  inconsistencies	  (out	  of	  6)	  in	  the	  flashbulb	  memories,	  for	  the	  202	  participants	  in	  the	  Four-­‐Survey	  Sample,	  for	  Surveys	  2	  and	  4.	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Figure 3.  Change of inconsistent memories from one survey to another:  S2 to S3:  
Inconsistent memories from Survey 2 either repeated or corrected on Survey 3; S2 to S3 
to S4:  Inconsistent memories from S2 repeated on S3 and either further repeated or 
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